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INTRODUCTION 
The canon of trusts and estates, that is, “the ways of thinking 
about [trusts and estates] law that are widely shared by legal scholars 
and especially by legal authorities, like legislators and judges,”1 
* Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Harold H.
Greene Professor of Law, George Washington University School of Law. Thanks to 
Carla Spivack for her support, to June Carbone and Bridget Crawford for their 
comments, and to Olivia Soloperto and Christine Kumar for research assistance. Some 
of the ideas explored in this piece have been developed through work with June 
Carbone, Nancy Levit, and Amy Ziettlow. I am grateful to the Wisconsin Law Review 
for making this symposium—and my keynote—possible. 
1. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canons of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825,
825 (2004); see also JILL E. HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 2–3, 11 (2014) 
[hereinafter FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED]; J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons 
of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 968 (1998) (defining a canon as a 
discipline’s “underlying assumptions, its current concerns and anxieties”). Hasday 
analyzes family law’s canons as “deeply rooted, widely held ways of thinking about 
family law and its guiding principles that gain strength from their repeated invocation.” 
FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED, supra, at 221. These canons center on “a series of 
overriding stories that purport to make sense of how the law governs family members 
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consists of several different and well-known strands: respect for dead 
hand (or transferor) control (up to certain limits); respect for formality; 
and valuation of the traditional legally-recognized family.2 Perhaps the 
most fundamental—and, paradoxically, the most visible and invisible—
strand is the “wealth” narrative, which focuses on the transmission of 
conventional forms of wealth.3 It is this final strand that I believe 
structures the rest of the field. 
The wealth narrative is the core of trusts and estates.4 Whatever 
other stories we tell about trusts and estates, whatever challenges we 
make to the existing strands, concern wealth. While this may seem 
obvious—another term for the field is “wealth transmission,” after all—
its explanatory power for other canonical stories and for what is left out 
of those stories is foundational and, in some surprising ways, 
unacknowledged and unaccounted for.5 When we address wealth 
transmission, we focus on wealth itself, on those who have wealth and 
their practices, and our guiding assumptions are based on our 
observations and assumptions about them. 
Consider, for example, just why dead hand control is important. 
Qe respect the dead hand not because we revere the dead, but because 
the decedent earned, or at least safeguarded, their wealth. Formality is 
critical to protecting the dead hand’s control over wealth and family is, 
in some ways, yet another form of wealth (consider that fathers were 
entitled to the earnings from their children’s labor).6 Our critiques of 
these principles similarly focus on wealth. Much of the race critique 
addresses the inheritance of race and problematizes race itself as a form 
of property. Furthermore, for much of our history, wealth has been 
concentrated in white married men. Historically, married women were 
legally limited in property ownership, and blacks could be considered 
property.7 That wealth structure profoundly affected—and affects—
 
and family life.” Id. at 2. As examples of “canonical narratives,” she notes the focus 
on the legal institutions of marriage and parenthood, and argues that such a focus 
“overlook[s] and offer[s] little protection to other family ties.” Id. at 5. 
 2.  See Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair”: An Empirical 
Study of How People Approach the Wealth Transmission System, 22 ELDER L.J. 325, 
326 (2015); see also RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER 
OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 6–7 (2010); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: 
Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 656 (2014). 
 3.  See Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 2, at 326–27. 
 4.  See id.; see also Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 128 YALE L.J. 
2 (2018) (discussing how substantive due process provides at least some forms of class-
based protections). 
5.  See Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 2, at 327. 
 6.  See Jillian Benbow, Under My Roof: Parents’ Rights to Children’s 
Earnings, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 71, 71 n.1 (2005).  
 7.  See, e.g., Carole Shammas, Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property 
Acts, 6 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 9, 9 (1994); Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race 
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trusts and estates legislation, practice, and scholarship. Our scholarship 
powerfully analyzes who is left out of receiving wealth, but we still 
focus on wealth. 
The wealth strand is, accordingly, highly visible, because so much 
of trusts and estates law is focused on wealth preservation and control, 
and influential, because its pervasiveness overshadows critical aspects 
of trusts and estates law. It has also largely been invisible because it 
serves as a subtle limitation on analyzing issues outside of the process 
of facilitating wealth transmission. Examining this wealth strand shows 
how it distorts the field,8 so I want to explore just what asking the 
wealth question,9 or using a wealth lens, would actually mean. 
Wealth transmission is effectuated, and enforced, through the laws 
of trusts and estates. Ownership of wealth is a legal matter, but 
unpacking its influence requires delving into economics and sociology: 
first, analyzing how wealth transmission also transmits privilege and 
maintenance of the status quo; second, looking at who has wealth; and 
third, how recognition of the sociodemographic diversity in ownership 
of wealth might affect the laws of the trusts and estates field in a variety 
of ways, ranging from wealth redistribution10 to changing the structure 
of intestate. 
To be sure, our scholarly attention is on how trusts and estates 
policies reinforce some forms of subordination. More profoundly, 
 
and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999); Mitchell F. Crusto, 
Blackness as Property Rights: Sex, Race, Status, and Wealth, 1 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 
51, 52 (2005).  
8.  Cf., Erez Aloni, The Marital Wealth Gap, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1, 14 
(2018) (noting the need to address wealth concentration and family law). As discussed 
infra, other trusts and estates scholars also apply the wealth lens. 
 9.  Katharine Bartlett famously formulated the “Woman Question”: 
(1) identifying and challenging those elements of existing legal doctrine that 
leave out or disadvantage women and members of other excluded groups 
(asking the “woman question”); (2) reasoning from an ideal in which legal 
resolutions are pragmatic responses to concrete dilemmas rather than static 
choices between opposing, often mismatched perspectives (feminist 
practical reasoning); and (3) seeking insights and enhanced perspectives 
through collaborative or interactive engagements with others based upon 
personal experience and narrative (consciousness-raising). 
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831 (1990). 
As Part II discusses, this question can be adapted to ask how our analysis of any 
doctrine affects people of varying socioeconomic levels; the opportunity to use doctrine 
to address the actual needs and preferences, rather than presumed or supposed ideals; 
and the need to draw on alternative perspectives and experiences. 
 10.  As Felix Chang observes, the “laws governing the transmission of wealth 
are poorly suited to tackle inequality.” Felix B. Chang, Asymmetries in the Generation 
and Transmission of Wealth, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 78 (2018). Nonetheless, as he also 
notes, a draconian estate and gift tax system would have significant effects on 
inequality. Id. at 85–86 (focusing not on gender issues, although mentioning race). See 
infra notes 117118 for further discussion of tax and inequality. 
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however, my argument relies on the observation that the use and 
transmission of wealth reinforces inequality.11 Ensuring that women can 
serve as executors of estates,12 for example, is a victory for gender 
equality, but directs our focus away from what happens to estates that 
never appear in probate court and, more fundamentally, from questions 
of what constitutes wealth and the use of wealth to perpetuate economic 
and gender inequality. 
I want to use this Article to step back and reflect on how new 
perspectives from gender, race, class, and sexual orientation have 
challenged existing trusts and estates canonical narratives on a number 
of different levels,13 both in terms of deepening trusts and estates but 
also expanding it—that is, challenging core concepts of the field. But I 
also want to urge us to show how what we do as trusts and estates 
lawyers is related to economic inequality. 
Part I celebrates how new perspectives have challenged the core 
trusts and estates canonical narratives, and builds on the significant 
analysis of these new perspectives by Bridget Crawford and Anthony 
Infanti.14 As this Article shows, these new perspectives challenge basic 
concepts of wealth and do the following: 1) bring in alternative 
conceptions of wealth and of inheritance; 2) question the biases of 
inheritance law as they reflect conventional social norms; and 3) 
contextualize the whole field so that it encompasses elder law, history, 
sociology, socioeconomics, and other areas. 
These new perspectives make a difference by causing us to 
question the intestacy regime,15 for example, or by broadening access to 
wills.16 And these challenges are brought both by those of us who 
 
 11.  See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 378 
(Arthur Goldhammer trans.) (2014) (“[W]ealth originating in the past automatically 
grows more rapidly . . . than wealth stemming from work . . . . [T]his tends to give 
lasting disproportionate importance to inequalities created in the past, and therefore to 
inheritance.”). 
 12.  See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (holding that unequal 
treatment on the basis of sex in selecting estate administrators violated the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
 13.  For a foundational article on these issues, see Bridget J. Crawford & 
Anthony C. Infanti, A Critical Research Agenda for Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 49 
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 317 (2014). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, Rita J. Simon & William Rau, Public 
Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession in the United 
States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319; Mary Louise Fellows, E. Gary Spitko & 
Charles Q. Strohm, An Empirical Assessment of the Potential for Will Substitutes to 
Improve State Intestacy Statutes, 85 IND. L.J. 409 (2010); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance 
on the Fringes of Marriage, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 235, 239–40. 
 16.  See Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt 
Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 880–81 (2012). 
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identify with the new critical trusts and estates scholarship17 and also by 
people outside of this movement, perhaps because they have been 
influenced by us, perhaps because of the embedded questions inherent 
in a focus on transferring wealth. 
The second Part turns to the structure of wealth and its 
intergenerational transmission, drawing on sociological and 
demographic data to show just who is wealthy and how wealth 
transmission perpetuates inequality, Finally, based on asking the wealth 
question,18 I suggest future directions that might lead to reexamination 
of some of the core tenets of trusts and estates: for example, wills may 
not be appropriate for everyone, and class differences in families show 
the need to include (or be more deliberate in excluding) alternative 
families. 
Ultimately, for trusts and estates scholarship to call attention to 
wealth inequality it must broaden its critique. This includes 
conventional trusts and estates topics, such as calls for improved access 
to estate planning and higher estate taxes.19 But it might also mean 
advocating for greater equality during lifetime, such as through analysis 
of a minimum income guarantee.20 While this may seem far afield from 
conventional trusts and estates topics—and it is—income inequality 
affects trusts and estates practice by defining the core issues and by 
determining the identity of our clients. At the end, I want to show how 
this brings us to a new understanding of inheritance. 
I. CELEBRATION 
I begin with a brief celebration of where we are today. My text is 
not cases, but our own scholarship, as applied to the core canonical 
stories of trusts and estates law that I identified earlier. A critical trusts 
and estates jurisprudence has shown how these stories—definitions of 
property, formalism and dead hand control, and family recognition—
 
 17.  See Crawford & Infanti, supra note 13, at 318 (“[C]ritical scholarship 
uses an ‘outsider’ perspective as a lens to examine the substance and structure of the 
law . . . [by] examining why the law has developed in the way it has and considering 
what impact the law has on historically disempowered groups . . . .”). 
18.  See supra note 9. 
 19.  See, e.g., Crawford & Infanti, supra note 13. at 342–47. 
 20.  See ALISSA QUART, SQUEEZED: WHY OUR FAMILIES CAN’T AFFORD 
AMERICA 240–45 (2018); see also Rosalind Dixon & Julie Suk, Liberal 
Constitutionalism and Economic Inequality, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 375 (2018) 
(noting that “many constitutional democracies . . . are actively considering, and 
passing, measures to increase investments in education and training, raise the minimum 
wage, [and] guarantee a universal basic income”). See generally ANNIE LOWREY, GIVE 
PEOPLE MONEY: HOW A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME WOULD END POVERTY, 
REVOLUTIONIZE WORK, AND REMAKE THE WORLD (2018). 
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reflect and reinforce social norms based on race, gender, sexual 
orientation, and class. 
A. Definitions of Property 
As critical jurisprudential trusts and estates scholars have shown, 
the bundle of sticks21 that constitutes property can be parsed, based on 
race, gender, and other categories.22 First, consider that white heirs 
were able to challenge wills that freed slaves, successfully arguing, for 
example, that “enslaved blacks were legally classified as immovable 
property” and so could not be emancipated.23 On the other hand, 
Barack Obama describes how his mother saw being black as being “the 
beneficiary of a great inheritance.”24 
Next, consider limitations on property based on citizenship. 
Property ownership has historically been tied to citizenship status, and 
courts in the nineteenth century might prevent noncitizens from 
inheriting through intestacy, regardless of whether they were closer in 
relationship to the decedent.25 Even today, approximately one-half of 
states impose restrictions on noncitizens’ property ownership rights in 
some way.26 This affects not just the ownership rights of noncitizens, 
but also those of citizens, whose land alienability is restricted.27 
 
 21.  “Ownership is a bundle of rights, such as the right to exclude others from 
the property, the right to use the property, the right to sell the property, and so forth.” 
Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 747, 829 (2015); see Bela 
August Walker, Privilege as Property, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 54 (2013) 
(stating that property is a “social category”). The sticks generally constitute: “(a) the 
right of disposition . . .; (b) the right of possession . . .; (c) the right of control . . .; 
(d) the right of enjoyment . . .; and lastly, (e) the right of exclusion . . . .” Id. 
 22.  See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 
1758, 1787–89 (1993); Kevin Noble Maillard, The Color of Testamentary Freedom, 62 
SMU L. REV. 1783, 1786 (2009) (“[M]y research shows that white collateral heirs, as 
both a first and last resort, have leveraged whiteness to contest wills that consciously 
excluded them.”). 
 23.  Crusto, supra note 7, at 106–07. 
 24.  BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND 
INHERITANCE 51 (1995). 
 25.  See Polly J. Price, Alien Land Restrictions in the American Common 
Law: Exploring the Relative Autonomy Paradigm, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 152, 155–56 
(1999) (discussing Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich. 24 (1870), in which distant relatives of a 
deceased landholder successfully challenged the right of closer relatives to inherit on 
the ground the more immediate heirs were not citizens); Rose Cuison Villazor, 
Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At the Intersection of Property, Race, and 
Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979, 1017 (2010) (discussing citizenship status-based 
restrictions on inheritance). 
 26.  Allison Brownell Tirres, Property Outliers: Non-Citizens, Property Rights 
and State Power, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 77, 97 (2012). 
 27.  Id. at 128. Elsewhere Tirres has argued that “property law [has been 
used] as a tool of immigration regulation.” Allison Brownell Tirres, Ownership Without 
2019:165 Dismantling the Trusts and Estates Canon 171 
Fourth, until the mid-nineteenth century, women lost rights to 
property upon marriage.28 Even after states enacted Married Women’s 
Property Acts, distinctions remained between free and enslaved women 
(until the Civil War),29 and between married women and men. 
Finally, the value of property varies. The decedent’s “dress 
clothes”30 might fetch little at resale, but could be invaluable to the 
heirs. 
 
*** 
 
 These examples challenge the seemingly neutral concept of 
property. 
B. Dead Hand Control and Formalism 
The testator’s intent is most respected when it accords with 
dominant notions of inheritance; and rights to testamentary freedom 
depend on social policy.31 Although dead hand control is celebrated and 
the right to control is a form of property, as shown above, the 
restrictions on who can inherit show the limitations on dead hand 
control. After the Civil War, anti-miscegenation statutes continued to 
ensure that blacks could not inherit from white spouses,32 and even 
attempts by white male partners to leave property to children born into 
their relationship with a black female partner were treated with 
suspicion.33 
 
Citizenship: The Creation of Noncitizen Property Rights, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 4 
(2013). 
 28.  See infra Part II. 
 29.  See, e.g., Bernie D. Jones, Southern Free Women of Color in the 
Antebellum North: Race, Class, and a “New Women’s Legal History,” 41 AKRON L. 
REV. 763, 774–75 (2008) (“[S]lave women were denied the legal status that white 
women had through marriage.”). 
 30. AMY ZIETTLOW & NAOMI CAHN, HOMEWARD BOUND 5 (2017). Clothes 
might also be important for burial. Id. at 112 (discussing mother’s burial in “a real nice 
Alabama shirt and some jogging pants”). 
 31.  See Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, 
Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 571, 585 (1999); Carla 
Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should Be Abolished, 58 
U. KAN. L. REV. 245, 308 (2010); Maillard, supra note 22, at 1788. 
 32.  Maillard, supra note 22, at 1792–93 (“Without the protective status that 
marriage conferred, courts viewed interracial families as inherently illegitimate, which 
opened estates to the rapacious strategies of white collateral heirs. The reliability of 
anti-miscegenist amnesia—that is, the narrative that the interracial family does not 
legally exist—fueled the redirection of testamentary intent.”). 
 33.  See, e.g., Davis, supra note 7, at, 280. 
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Both husbands and wives were limited by dower and curtesy, until 
the doctrines’ abolition.34 Until the Married Women’s Property Acts, 
testators were restricted in what they could bequeath to married women 
for the women’s own use,35 and married women faced restrictions 
themselves on their testation rights.36  
In 1981, Jeffrey Sherman argued “that the lover-legatee of a 
homosexual testator faces a more difficult task at probate than does his 
heterosexual counterpart.”37 Undue influence has been an oft-used 
means to challenge wills in favor of same-sex partners38 and has also 
been used to challenge other bequests deemed unconventional.39 
Moreover, dead hand control may reflect, and thus perpetuate, 
societal discrimination. While charitable bequests can no longer 
discriminate on the basis of race, some religions may disfavor 
women,40 some estate planning practices (such as the QTIP) may also 
disadvantage women.41 
 
 34.  See, e.g., Damaris Rosich-Schwartz, Tenancy by the Entirety: The 
Traditional Version of the Tenancy Is the Best Alternative for Married Couples, 
Common Law Marriages, and Same-Sex Partnerships, 84 N.D. L. REV. 23, 36 (2008). 
Moreover, “informal restrictions confined single women’s ability” to own property. 
Laura M. Padilla, Gendered Shades of Property: A Status Check on Gender, Race & 
Property, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 361, 362 (2002). See generally Carla Spivack, 
Law, Land, Identity: The Case of Lady Anne Clifford, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 393, 403 
(2012) (discussing common law limitations on inheritance of property by females); 
Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the 
Married Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 165 (2014) (same). 
 35.  See, e.g., Shammas, supra note 7, at 11. 
 36.  See Alfred L. Brophy & Douglas Thie, Land, Slaves, and Bonds: Trust 
and Probate in the Pre-Civil War Shenandoah Valley, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 345, 361–
62 (2016) (“[M]arried women in Virginia during the period studied here had limited 
rights to dispose of property at death. This . . . helps explain why property was left to 
daughters in a legal life estate or in an equitable life estate. Thus, when the daughters 
passed away they had no property interest, and the property went immediately to their 
issue.”) (citation omitted). 
 37.  Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 
U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 246 (1981). 
 38.  See, e.g., Camille M. Quinn & Shawna S. Baker, Essential Estate 
Planning for the Constitutionally Unrecognized Families in Oklahoma: Same-Sex 
Couples, 40 TULSA L. REV. 479, 501–06 (2005); see E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not 
Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms 
Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 278–86, 294–
314 (1999). 
 39.  See Crawford & Infanti, supra note 13, at 330–31 (examining gender 
stereotypes embedded in the doctrine of undue influence). 
 40.  See, e.g., Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Religiously Inspired Gender-Bias 
Disinheritance—What’s Law Got to Do with It? 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 669 (2010); 
Shelly Kreiczer-Levy & Meital Pinto, Property and Belongingness: Rethinking Gender-
Based Disinheritance, 21 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 119, 148–49 (2011). 
 41.  See Karen J. Sneddon, Not Your Mother’s Will: Gender, Language, and 
Wills, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1535, 1573–74 (2015) (“Due to life expectancies, QTIPs are 
2019:165 Dismantling the Trusts and Estates Canon 173 
Even critiques of dead hand control show a wealth bias. As 
Bridget Crawford points out, some of these analyses suggest that 
current generations will be better able to manage the wealth they have 
inherited without restrictions, reflecting a belief in a meritocracy that 
“ironically allows us to ignore wealth differences.”42 
Dead hand control is implemented by respect for the formality 
attendant to wills. A will expresses not just the testator’s wishes, but 
also commands. Women tend to use precatory language more than men, 
so a formal written document (which eschews precatory language) may 
be more likely to translate language into the more directive language 
that men tend to use.43 Indeed, as Karen Sneddon observes, “initial 
reactions to precatory language and expressive language are tinged with 
dismissal of ‘non-technical language’ as ‘mere fluff.’”44 
More fundamentally, while wills do not require lawyers, being 
able to develop an error-free will that is appropriately channeled 
depends on the testator’s “characteristics, external resources, and [legal 
and] social environment.”45 Yet, one study comparing holographic and 
nonholographic wills found that holographic wills, while more likely to 
include drafting errors, were no more likely to be challenged.46 This 
raises questions of just how much protection formality provides for 
testamentary intent as opposed to the other factors that might lead 
disappointed heirs to challenge a will. 
 
more frequently created for female spouses with the ultimate disposition of the trust 
property then being directed by the deceased male spouse.”). For further commentary 
on QTIPS and gender bias, see Wendy C. Gerzog, Solutions to the Sexist QTIP 
Provision, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 97, 97–99 (2000); Wendy C. Gerzog, The 
Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 301, 306 (1995). See also Susan M. Chesler & Karen J. Sneddon, Tales 
from a Form Book: Stock Stories and Transactional Documents, 78 MONT. L. REV. 
237, 274 (2017) (discussing stock characters in wills). 
42.  Personal communication, April 2, 2019. 
 43.  See Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Gender, Language, and the 
Law of Precatory Words in Wills, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 46–47 (2007); Sneddon, 
supra note 41, at 1551 (“[T]he language of the law itself is male. The ability to shape 
language ‘depends, among other things, on one’s apparent legitimacy to engage in that 
activity.’ Those who ‘engaged’ in the making of the law and the practice of the law 
before the nineteenth century were exclusively men.”) (citations omitted). Kevin 
Maillard writes about the “legal power of whiteness” with respect to inheritance. 
Maillard, supra note 22, at 1787–88.  
 44.  Sneddon, supra note 41, at 1567. 
 45.  Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Distributive Justice and Donative Intent, 65 
UCLA L. REV. 324, 338 (2018). 
 46.  Stephen Clowney, In Their Own Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills 
and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 27, 59 (2008). 
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C. Definitions of Family 
One of the core concepts in the trusts and estates canon is 
inheritance through the bloodline. Using a race lens shows us that 
doctrines are not what they appear to be, and this is intertwined with 
the previous discussion of definitions of wealth—slave children 
inherited their status from their mothers, so, upon birth, became 
property—but also involves the interconnected claims of race and 
legitimacy that characterized the initial challenges to the inheritance of 
nonmarital children.47 Similarly, LGBTQ legal jurisprudence has 
questioned the primacy of the bloodline.48 Just a few examples follow. 
Consider the questions of whether nonmarital children can inherit 
from their fathers. In the initial state court proceedings that evolved 
into a “landmark” Supreme Court case involving such rights,49 the 
“lawyers made race as well as sex discrimination arguments when 
challenging Illinois’s inheritance laws in state court, but apparently 
dropped the race-based disparate impact arguments on appeal to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.”50 The very question of whether nonmarital 
children could inherit from their fathers undermines the primacy of the 
canonical bloodline.51 
 
47.  Maillard, supra note 22, at 1815–16. Maillard states that: 
[T]he larger legal system supports testamentary larceny in blatant 
contradiction to explicit legal language recognizing, promoting, and 
memorializing intimate connections between black and white. Testamentary 
freedom, in all of its aspirational claims, means nothing in the face of a 
legal system rooted in the restrictive and damaging conformity of 
‘legitimate’ families. 
Id. at 1816. 
48.  See Crawford & Infanti, supra note 13, at 336–38. 
 49.  Paula A. Monopoli, Toward Equality: Nonmarital Children and the 
Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 995, 999 (2012). 
 50.  Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and the Constitution of Family Status, 32 
CONST. COMMENT. 377, 390 (2017). In Trimble, the Supreme Court struck down parts 
of Illinois’s probate code that allowed nonmarital children to inherit through intestacy 
from their mothers, but not their fathers, as a violation of equal protection where the 
classification was based on legitimacy. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
The lower court noted that: “In support of the position that the statutory framework is 
racially discriminatory, petitioner in cause No. 47092 sets forth various statistical 
sources which she says indicate that an excessively disproportionate share of 
illegitimate children were born to blacks and other minorities as compared to 
Caucasians.” In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234, 239 (Ill. 1975). 
 51.  See Linda Kelly Hill, Equal Protection Misapplied: The Politics of 
Gender and Legitimacy and the Denial of Inheritance, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & 
L. 129, 147 (2006) (discussing the concept of “filius nullius,” under which an 
“illegitimate child was the child and heir of no one”). 
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While these challenges were designed to recognize bloodlines, 
critical trusts and estates jurisprudence has also challenged the 
heteronormativity of family definitions.52 
 
* * * 
 
Taken together, these critiques challenge core canons, such as 
dead hand control and the primacy of the bloodline. 
II. CHALLENGE: HOW WEALTH STRUCTURES TRUSTS AND ESTATES 
But there is still more to be done as we deepen our critique, and 
that involves consistently applying a class lens and going beyond 
traditional trusts and estates topics. Trusts and estates law, scholarship, 
and practice have generally focused on the wealthy.53 That is the 
population who can pay the bills of estate planning attorneys and who 
are most likely to write wills;54 much of our scholarship focuses on 
studying the wealth-transmitting population, mistakes made by their 
attorneys, how better to effectuate the intent of that population, to 
whom they leave—and do not leave—property, etc. Of course, even 
that population is “heterogeneous, and many middle-class individuals 
make arrangements for property after their deaths, even if that property 
is more modest—for example, a small family home or a collection of 
heirlooms.”55 But more than half of the population does not write 
wills,56 most low-income Americans have no money saved for 
retirement,57 approximately 40% of Americans do not have life 
insurance,58 and almost two-thirds have not planned for incapacity.59 
 
 52.  See Crawford & Infanti, supra note 13, at 335–37 (documenting the work 
of E. Gary Spitko, Tom Gallanis, and Mary Louise Fellows, among others). 
 53.  See Boni-Saenz, supra note 45, at 329. 
 54.  Older white people with a graduate degree are the most likely to have 
wills. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority in U.S. Do Not Have a Will, GALLUP (May 18, 
2016), https://news.gallup.com/poll/191651/majority-not.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/U5VC-CHM5].  
 55.  Boni-Saenz, supra note 45, at 329; see David Horton, Intestacy, Wills, 
and Intent: A Short Comment on Wright & Sterner, 43 ACTEC L.J. 339, 342 (2018) 
(noting heterogeneity of wills). 
 56.  Nick DiUlio, More Than Half of American Adults Don’t Have a Will, 
2017 Survey Shows, CARING.COM, https://www.caring.com/articles/wills-survey-2017 
[https://perma.cc/7A9K-XRBT]; Jones, supra note 54. 
 57.  See Monique Morrissey, The State of American Retirement, ECON. POL’Y 
INST. (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.epi.org/publication/retirement-in-america/#charts 
[https://perma.cc/2JLR-33N6] (“In 2013, nearly nine in [ten] families in the top income 
fifth had retirement account savings, compared with fewer than one in [ten] families in 
the bottom income fifth.”). 
 58.  New Study Reveals More than 40 Percent of Americans Don’t Have Any 
Form of Life Insurance, MKT. WATCH (Sept. 4, 2018 10:00 AM), 
176 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
We use the preferences of those who die with wills to make 
recommendations for those who die intestate and whose property passes 
outside of probate courts.60 Indeed, further study of how inheritance 
happens outside of probate court is needed,61 and there is a need for 
more scholarship on non-financial issues, such as the guardianship of 
children,62 at death or incapacity. 
As this Part shows, wealth functions in trusts and estates at 
different levels. A first issue, discussed above, is just what constitutes 
wealth. Second is looking at how wealth is distributed and who is thus 
more likely to engage in estate planning. Third is the relationship 
between wealth transmission and economic inequality. This Section 
turns first to address the socioeconomics of wealth, that is, who has 
wealth, and then turns to the deeper structure of wealth in our society, 
how having wealth reinforces economic inequality. It then shows the 
impact of wealth on intergenerational mobility, and finally, how asset 
transmission contributes to intergenerational wealth inequality. The 
final part concludes by using this analysis to argue for the need for 
greater self-consciousness and acknowledgement of the potential for 
bias that results from relying on the preferences of those people who 
leave records. 
A. Structure of Wealth 
The conventional definition of wealth is financial and we live at a 
time of increasing economic inequality, in which wealth accumulation 
is increasingly concentrated in a smaller percentage of the population 
 
https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/new-study-reveals-more-than-40-percent-
of-americans-dont-have-any-form-of-life-insurance-2018-09-04 
[https://perma.cc/MYW7-RWTN]; Peter R. Orszag, The Decline of Life Insurance Is a 
Mystery, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 27, 2018, 4:30AM CST), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-27/the-decline-of-life-insurance-
is-a-mystery (“The share of Americans with life insurance has fallen to less than 60 
percent, from 77 percent in 1989.”). 
 59.  Carolyn Crist, Over One Third of U.S. Adults Have Advanced Medical 
Directives, REUTERS (July 11, 2017 5:11 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
health-usa-advance-directives/over-one-third-of-u-s-adults-have-advanced-medical-
directives-idUSKBN19W2NO [https://perma.cc/C99F-4YXB]. 
 60.  See infra note 116. 
 61.  Studying these issues is, of course, difficult. For some of this work, see 
Mary Louise Fellows, supra note 15 (intestacy), Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 2; 
DiRusso, supra note 43, and Hirsch, supra note 15. 
62.  Cf. Deirdre M. Smith, Keeping It in the Family: Minor Guardianship as 
Private Child Protection, 18 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. (forthcoming) (draft at 6–7), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3349167 (noting the lack of 
scholarship relating to minor guardianships as used in child protection proceedings). 
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that depends less on wages and more on investment income.63 Thus, 
assets that are inherited are critically important in maintaining and 
building wealth. The term “wealth” refers to any assets, ranging from 
bank accounts to stocks to real property; it is thus different from 
income, which, until it becomes wealth, is transitory and is an ongoing 
flow (that, obviously, stops at death).64 Both wealth and income provide 
measures of economic status and inequality65 (although wealth 
preservation is the focus of many trusts and estates practitioners). 
Some of the wealth structure statistics are straightforward, and 
they document the gap between wealthy and non-wealthy families. In 
1978, the 0.1% richest families owned 7% of the country’s wealth; by 
2012, that had grown to 22%.66 Taking a broader measure of wealth 
families, the median upper-income family (those who make more than 
$127,600) now holds 75 times the wealth of the median low-income 
family (those who make less than $42,500); in 2007, top earners were 
worth 40 times as much; and in 1989, the multiple was 28.67 The 
bottom half, based on household income, of the American population 
owned about 1.2% of total wealth, while the top 1% of households 
owned more than 38% of the wealth.68 
 
 63.  See Nelson D. Schwartz, The Recovery Threw the Middle-Class Under a 
Benz, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/business/middle-class-financial-crisis.html 
[https://perma.cc/FQ32-GSMQ] (“[T]he proportion of family income from wages has 
dropped from nearly 70[%] to just under 61[%].”). 
 64.  See Aloni, supra note 8, at 7–9 (2018) (defining wealth and income, and 
noting that wealth is capable of transfer and sale); Angela Hanks, Danyelle Solomon & 
Christian E. Weller, Systematic Inequality: How America’s Structural Racism Helped 
Create the Black-White Wealth Gap, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 21, 2018 9:03 
AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2018/02/21/447051/systematic-
inequality/ [https://perma.cc/X83A-CFJ3]. 
 65.  See Drew DeSilver, The Many Ways to Measure Economic Inequality, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/09/22/the-many-ways-to-measure-economic-inequality/ 
[https://perma.cc/UB4X-7LEW] (discussing income, consumption, and household 
wealth and noting “[m]ost researchers agree that wealth is more unevenly distributed 
than income, while consumption is less concentrated at the upper end than either wealth 
or income”). 
 66.  EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. , 
WEALTH INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1913: EVIDENCE FROM CAPITALIZED 
INCOME TAX DATA 1 (2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20625.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7MTT-ETSC]. 
 67.  Lydia DePillis, America’s Wealth Gap is Bigger than Ever, CNN BUS. 
(Nov. 3, 2017, 4:09 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/03/news/economy/wealth-
gap-america/index.html [https://perma.cc/98ZS-QR47]. 
 68.  Wealth Distribution in the United States in 2016, STATISTA (July 2018), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/203961/wealth-distribution-for-the-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/E7SF-5JW9]. 
178 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
At the same time, turning to income, there is a growing earnings 
gap between the college and non-college educated.69 And the gap in 
weekly wages between the top and bottom is increasing.70 By 2016, the 
average CEO pay at top companies was 361 times as high as median 
worker income; in the late 1950s, it was approximately 20 times.71  
Yet these overall statistics mask significant differences by race, 
ethnicity, gender, marital status, and age. 
1. RACE 
Income and wealth vary by race and between races.72 Consider that 
Asians earn more than any other group, and yet their income inequality 
is also higher than any other group.73 
When it comes to wealth distribution, “blacks between 50 and 65 
years old and near retirement had only about 10% of the wealth of 
whites in the same age group.”74 Indeed, “African Americans have 
fewer assets than whites and are less likely to be homeowners, to own 
 
69.  THE RISING COST OF NOT GOING TO COLLEGE, PEW CTR. (2014), 
http://www.pew.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/02/SDT-higher-ed-FINAL-02-11-
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/KAA6-H3K7]. 
 70.  Naomi Cahn, June Carbone & Nancy Levit, Gender and the Tournament: 
Reinventing Antidiscrimination Law in an Age of Inequality, 96 TEX. L. REV. 425, 455 
(2018); see also Drew DeSilver, For Most U.S. Workers, Real Wages Have Barely 
Budged in Decades, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/10/09/for-most-workers-real-wages-have-barely-budged-for-decades/ 
[https://perma.cc/QW44-CBRW]. 
71.  Diana Hembree, CEO Pay Skyrockets to 361 Times that of the Average 
Worker, FORBES (May 22, 2018, 04:28pm), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dianahembree/2018/05/22/ceo-pay-skyrockets-to-361-
times-that-of-the-average-worker/#173128fe776d [https://perma.cc/U4PU-MSNV]; see 
Benjamin F. Mitchell, Report: CEO Pay More Than 300 Times Average Workers in 
2014, USA TODAY (June 21, 2015, 7:02PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/06/21/epi-report-ceo-pay-303-times-
average-2014/29000333/ [https://perma.cc/BPW7-RM4X]. As with other sectors, the 
disparities between top firms and others often exacerbate differences in compensation. 
See Executive Paywatch: High-Paid CEOs and the Low-Wage Economy, AFL-CIO, 
http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2014 [https://perma.cc/4WS2-
NCF6]. 
72.  See Anthony Cilluffo & Rakesh Kochhar, How Wealth Inequality Has 
Changed in the U.S. Since the Great Recession, by Race, Ethnicity and Income, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/01/how-
wealth-inequality-has-changed-in-the-u-s-since-the-great-recession-by-race-ethnicity-
and-income/ [https://perma.cc/7R3N-FZVN]. 
 73.  Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony Cilluffo, Key Findings on the Rise in Income 
Inequality Within America’s Racial and Ethnic Groups, PEW RES. CTR. (July 12, 2018), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/12/key-findings-on-the-rise-in-income-
inequality-within-americas-racial-and-ethnic-groups/ [https://perma.cc/J5DH-L98W]. 
 74.  Hanks et al., supra note 66.  
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their own business, and to have a retirement account.”75 Moreover, 
even when these types of assets were owned by blacks, their value was 
still much lower than comparable assets owned by whites.76 Blacks and 
Hispanics were significantly less likely than whites to have savings 
outside of a retirement account to provide them funds when they retired 
and were somewhat less likely to have Social Security.77 
2. AGE 
The poverty rate for older people is comparatively low, at about 
8%, although a larger number are economically insecure, and, in line 
with the rest of the population, their rates are not increasing, but their 
numbers are growing.78 Moreover, overall poverty rates for older 
people mask the differences based on marital status, race, gender, and 
other factors. Indeed, the National Institute on Retirement Security 
reported that women who are sixty-five and older have incomes that are 
25% lower than men’s of the same age, and that the women are 80% 
more likely than men to be impoverished.79 
The general poverty rate for older Americans who are living alone 
(or with nonrelatives) is 18%.80 Married women who are 65 and older 
have a low poverty rate (2%), particularly compared to the poverty 
rates for widowed (13%), divorced (16%), and never-married women 
(18%).81 Turning to those specifically affected by grey divorce, women 
 
 75.  Id.  
 76.  See id. 
77.  Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2017 – May 
2018, FED. RESEARCH BD., https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2018-
economic-well-being-of-us-households-in-2017-retirement.htm 
[https://perma.cc/QA3X-Z79H]. 
 78.  See Poverty Rate by Age, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/poverty-rate-by-
age/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort
%22:%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/7PRL-SENN].  
 79.  Women 80% More Likely to Be Impoverished in Retirement, NAT’L INST. 
ON RET. SEC. (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.nirsonline.org/2016/03/women-80-more-
likely-to-be-impoverished-in-retirement/ [https://perma.cc/9JQF-LTGC].  
80.  Ashley Edwards et al., Outlying Older Americans: The Puzzle of 
Increasing Poverty Among Those 65 and Older, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: CENSUS BLOGS 
(Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-
samplings/2017/09/outlying_older_ameri.html [https://perma.cc/H3LF-RRZ7]. 
81.  STEVEN A. SASS, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH, HOW WORK & 
MARRIAGE TRENDS AFFECT SOCIAL SECURITY’S FAMILY BENEFITS 5 (2016), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/IB_16-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF5V-
BW7S]. 
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are more than twice as likely as men to be poor (27% compared to 
11%).82  
The higher rates for divorced and never-married women probably 
reflect selection effects rather than a marriage bonus per se: nonmarital 
and divorce rates are higher among groups that typically have lower 
lifetime earnings and retirement incomes.83 
Social Security provides benefits during retirement to qualified 
workers, and the Social Security system is responsible for ensuring that 
almost a third of people over age sixty-five are not poor.84 While Social 
Security is available to employees who have worked for ten or more 
years, individuals can claim based either on their own work record or 
on that of a spouse or (with certain limitations) a former spouse; a 
spouse is entitled to 50% of the amount that the other spouse would 
receive, and even if a spouse’s own benefits are less than that amount, 
they will be “topped up.”85 
 
 82.  See I-Fen Lin, Susan L. Brown & Anna M. Hammersmith, Marital 
Biography, Social Security, and Poverty, 39 RES. ON AGING 86, 98 (2016). Jocelyn 
Elise Crowley labels these consequences the gray divorce penalty. JOCELYN ELISE 
CROWLEY, GRAY DIVORCE: WHAT WE LOSE AND GAIN FROM MID-LIFE SPLITS 17 
(2018). She notes that women face financial penalties because of their childrearing 
responsibilities and workforce patterns; men experience a “social” penalty because they 
have less robust social support. Id. 
83.  See generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW 
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014) (reporting on the class 
divergence in marriage rates).  
 84.  Kathleen Romig, Social Security Lifts More Americans Above Poverty 
than Any Other Program, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 5, 2018), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/social-security-keeps-22-million-
americans-out-of-poverty-a-state-by-state [https://perma.cc/G5G4-4HXS]; Teresa 
Ghilarducci, Bridget Fisher & Zachary Knauss, Now is the Time to Add Retirement 
Accounts to Social Security: The Guaranteed Retirement Account Proposal, SCHWARTZ 
CTR. FOR ECON. POL’Y ANALYSIS, at 4 (June 2015), 
http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/retirement_security_background/
GRA_3.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MGY-SPG7].  
 85.  Indeed, if one spouse is the primary or sole wage earner, the other spouse 
can receive Social Security even though that spouse has not paid into the system. lines. 
See SASS, supra note 81, at 2 (“Spousal benefits guarantee the wife a Primary Insurance 
Amount (PIA) [] equal to half her husband’s PIA. . . . If a woman is eligible for a 
worker benefit based on her own earnings history that exceeds the spousal [] benefit, 
she will receive the larger amount. If her worker benefit is lower, then she is ‘topped 
up’ to the level of the spousal or survivor benefit”). With increasing divorce and never-
married rates, however, the number of people able to claim on their spouse’s earnings 
is decreasing, particularly for nonwhite populations. See Tom Anderson, Married 
Couples Have 81 Ways to Claim Social Security. Here’s How to Maximize Your 
Benefits, CNBC (June 4, 2017, 11:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/02/how-
married-couples-can-maximize-their-social-security-benefits.html 
[https://perma.cc/KV5W-GS9R]; SOC. SEC. ADMIN., MARRIAGE TRENDS AND WOMEN’S 
BENEFITS: DIFFERENCES BY RACE-ETHNICITY AND NATIVITY (2014), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/research-summaries/marriage-trends-race-
ethnicity.pdf html [https://perma.cc/TA4V-4H3R]. 
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84% of Americans sixty-five and older receive benefits, with more 
than 60% of Social Security beneficiaries receiving one-half or more of 
their income through such benefits.86 Notably, 34% of all beneficiaries 
receive almost all (at least 90%) of their income from Social Security.87 
There are significant variations by race. Black, Hispanic, and Asian 
seniors are more likely to rely on Social Security benefits as their sole 
source of income, at rates of 32%, 40%, and 26% (respectively), while 
for whites, it is 18%.88 Marital status also has an impact: about 48% of 
married couples, and 71% of unmarried individuals, receive one-half or 
more of their income from SSA.89 Disability and sexual orientation also 
create significant disparities. With changes in retirement plans, longer 
lifespans and higher costs for health care, “these high rates of reliance 
on Social Security benefits are not surprising.”90 Nor is the rise in 
household debt and grey bankruptcy unexpected91—the high reliance on 
Social Security also indicates the comparative lack of wealth among 
these groups. 
3. WOMEN AND WEALTH 
The numbers on women and wealth are more difficult to collect, 
with differing estimates depending on the age group (and source). 
Globally, women hold 30% of private wealth, and constitute 10% of 
the wealthiest individuals.92 By 2020, they are expected to hold $72 
trillion, or 32% of the total.93 One report on women in the United 
 
 86.  SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FAST FACTS & FIGURES ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY, 
2017 at 8 (2017), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2017/fast_facts17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9PM2-HVSU]. 
 87.  Id. at 8. 
 88.  See Social Security and People of Color, NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS., 
https://www.nasi.org/learn/socialsecurity/people-of-color [https://perma.cc/2YR2-
AYP6] (reporting on 2014 data). 
 89.  See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 86, at 7.  
 90.  Francine J. Lipman & James E. Williamson, Social Security Retirement 
Benefits: A Timing Model for Working Families 14 NAELA 1, 2 (2018). 
 91.  Deborah Thorne, Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless & Katherine M. 
Porter, Graying of U.S. Bankruptcy: Fallout from Life in a Risk Society 11 (Indiana 
Legal Studies Res. Paper No. 406, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3226574 (finding an almost a 
five-fold increase over the past 25 years). 
 92.  Women’s Wealth Is Rising, ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/03/08/womens-wealth-is-rising 
[https://perma.cc/VF8C-Y4QU]. 
 93.  Investment by Women, and in Them, Is Growing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 
2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/03/08/investment-by-
women-and-in-them-is-growing [https://perma.cc/ZA2U-RNTK]. 
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States estimates that women own 51% of American private wealth.94 By 
contrast, another report estimates that women control approximately 
one-fifth of US wealth.95 Nonetheless, based on census household 
values, women age sixty-five and over who are heads of households 
have a higher net worth than male householders.96 Moreover, because 
women are statistically more likely to live longer than men and men are 
likely to earn more than women, widows may accumulate more money 
when their spouses die. Of course, this statistic must be tempered by 
the recognition that these widows are also likely to incur health care 
costs and their wealth may take the form of trusts to which they have 
relatively limited access. 
C. Wealth Has an Impact on Children97 
Stanford economist Raj Chetty, a leading expert on social 
mobility, found that millennials born in the 1980s are less likely than 
their parents were to out-earn their parents.98 For black and Native 
 
 94.  BMO WEALTH INST., FINANCIAL CONCERNS OF WOMEN 2 (2015), 
https://www.bmo.com/privatebank/pdf/Q1-2015-Wealth-Institute-Report-Financial-
Concerns-of-Women.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5E7-D4NE]. 
 95.  Reshma Kapadia, The Stubborn Wealth Gap Between Men and Women, 
BARRON’S (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-stubborn-wealth-gap-
between-men-and-women-1524099601 [https://perma.cc/9FTH-PE4P] (finding 
household net worth in the U.S. in 2017 “was almost $100 trillion in the fourth quarter 
of 2017, according to the Federal Reserve” and that “[b]y 2020, women are expected to 
control $22 trillion of it”). 
 96.  Wealth, Asset Ownership, & Debt of Households Detailed Tables: 2013, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2013/demo/wealth/wealth-asset-ownership.html 
[https://perma.cc/UM5U-2CR6]. 
 97.  Probability of Children’s Income Level, Given Parents’ Income Level, 
THE HAMILTON PROJECT (July 18, 2013), 
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/charts/probability_of_childrens_income_level_given_p
arents_income_level [https://perma.cc/C7KQ-ZWRK]. 
 98.  Jim Tankersley, American Dream Collapsing for Young Adults, Study 
Says, as Odds Plunge that Children Will Earn More than Their Parents, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 8, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/12/08/american-dream-
collapsing-for-young-americans-study-says-finding-plunging-odds-that-children-earn-
more-than-their-parents/?utm_term=.4a45fa997891 [https://perma.cc/M5C9-9T6F]. 
For further information on changes and trends in social mobility, see the following: 
JONATHAN VESPA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE CHANGING ECONOMICS AND 
DEMOGRAPHICS OF YOUNG ADULTHOOD: 1975–2016 (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/p20-
579.pdf [https://perma.cc/BR2L-2XNR]; New Census Bureau Statistics Show How 
Young Adults Today Compare with Previous Generations in Neighborhoods Nationwide, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/2014/cb14-219.html [https://perma.cc/DE8M-LZ4P]; RAJ CHETTY ET AL., THE 
OPPORTUNITY ATLAS: MAPPING THE CHILDHOOD ROOTS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY, 
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American children, downward mobility is even bleaker: a black child 
born to parents in the top quintile is roughly as likely to fall to the 
bottom family income quintile as to remain in the top quintile, while, 
by contrast, a white child born in that same quintile is almost five times 
as likely to stay there as fall to the bottom one.99 
  As critical race theorists have argued, the intergenerational 
transmission of wealth is “integral to the future perpetuation of racial 
inequality across generations” in a number of ways: 1) “education, 
experiences, friendships, and contacts,” including college tuition; 2) 
lifetime support, such as qualifying for a first home; and 3) gifting and 
inheriting assets.100 Moreover, the initial disadvantages of inheritance 
under slavery “became embedded in social institutions and transmitted 
across generations.”101 
Financial assets are important to maintaining intergenerational 
wealth (although plenty of self-made billionaires exist) both because of 
the transmission of actual property102 and also because of the 
transmission of advantage.103 There is ample data to support the 
importance of such legacies. Intergenerational transfers (whether 
through gift or bequest) accounts “for at least 50%—and perhaps more 
 
OPPORTUNITY INSIGHTS (2018), https://opportunityinsights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/atlas_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TL3-L752]; Richard Fry, 
Ruth Igielnik & Eileen Patten, How Millennials Today Compare with Their 
Grandparents 50 Years Ago, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 16, 2018), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/16/how-millennials-compare-with-their-
grandparents/ [https://perma.cc/7MUG-NU22]. 
 99.  RAJ CHETTY ET AL., RACE AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED 
STATES: AN INTERGENERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (2018), http://www.equality-of-
opportunity.org/assets/documents/race_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZNY-GPZX]. 
 100.  R. Richard Banks, “Nondiscriminatory” Perpetuation of Racial 
Subordination Black Wealth/White Wealth, 76 B.U. L. REV. 669, 685–86 (1996) (book 
review). 
 101.  Patricia Hill Collins, African-American Women and Economic Justice: A 
Preliminary Analysis of Wealth, Family, and African-American Social Class, 65 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 825 (1997). 
 102.  See, e.g., PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 22, 246 (discussing the impact of 
inherited wealth).  
 103.  See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family 
Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 730 (1988) (“A central thesis of this 
article is that paying for education has become the characteristic mode of 
intergenerational wealth transmission for most American families.”); Mark L. Ascher, 
Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 90 (1990) (proposing “a system that 
allows (or even encourages) parents to use their material advantages to benefit their 
children through acculturation and education yet prohibits transfers of purely financial 
advantage”); Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129, 193 (2008) (exploring basis for testamentary freedom of 
disinheriting children); see also Daniel J. Amato, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: 
The Political Economy and Unintended Consequences of Perpetual Trusts, 86 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 637, 672 (2013) (“[E]state taxation creates significant inefficiencies by 
distorting economic decisionmaking.”). 
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than 80%—of the net worth of families in the United States.”104 
Research on inter-generational mobility shows that parental income has 
an impact on both wealth and income.105 Household income is closely 
related to college attendance106 and graduation,107 and those “born to 
wealth” are much more likely to have college (or an advanced degree) 
and to work in a family business, another way of concentrating 
wealth.108 
While transfers of $1,000,000 or more constitute only about 2% of 
the actual number of transfers at death, they account for 40% of the 
total dollars transferred, and while over 70% of inter vivos gifts are less 
than $50,000, the relatively few gifts in amounts exceeding $1,000,000 
account for almost half of the total dollars received.109 The median net 
worth of those gift and inheritance recipients is almost three times that 
of the median net worth of the population.110 
As the Federal Reserve Board’s website acerbically notes, “the 
bulk of intergenerational transfers are flowing to families that already 
have substantial resources,” with the top 10% of households (by 
income) receiving more than one-third of intergenerational transfers (as 
 
 104.  Aloni, supra note 8, at 26; see Osamudia R. James, Valuing Identity, 102 
MINN. L. REV. 127, 159 (2017) (finding that the U.S. economy has failed “to support 
economic security and stability through any means other than intergenerational wealth 
transfer”). 
 105.  E.g., Ray Boshara, Born on 3rd Base? The Effects of Head Starts and 
College on Family Wealth, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/april/born-third-base-effect-head-
starts-college-family-wealth [https://perma.cc/LS8J-P7FF] (“[T]he typical middle-aged 
families with the most ‘favorable’ inherited traits—white and college-educated parents—
had three times as much income and six times as much wealth compared with the 
median family in the entire population.”). 
 106.  Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of Opportunity?: The Geography of 
Intergenerational Mobility in the United States (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 19843, 2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w19843.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XB44-AP7F]; Richard V. Reeves & Eleanor Krause, Raj Chetty in 14 
Charts: Big Findings on Opportunity and Mobility We Should All Know, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-
memos/2018/01/11/raj-chetty-in-14-charts-big-findings-on-opportunity-and-mobility-
we-should-know/ [https://perma.cc/W7Y5-CE7Z]. 
107.  V. Joseph Hotz et al., The Role of Parental Wealth and Income in 
Financing Children’s College Attendance and Its Consequences (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 25144, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25144.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7QWV-BXW9]. 
108.  Laura Feiveson & John Sabelhaus, How Does Intergenerational Wealth 
Transmission Affect Wealth Concentration?, FED. RES. BD. (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/how-does-intergenerational-
wealth-transmission-affect-wealth-concentration-20180601.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ZK6K-4JCF]. 
 109.  Id.  
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shown below), and the top 10% (by wealth) receiving more than 
50%.111 
 
Table 1. Concentration of Intergeneration Transfers Received by 
Income and Wealth112 
 
 Income by Income Group Wealth by Income Group 
Bottom Half 21% 8% 
50th to 90th Percentiles 41% 36% 
Top 10 Percent 38% 56% 
 
Wealth begets more wealth. Consider that when someone has poor 
credit (a low, or no, credit score), this can impact both employment 
and housing options and also result in decreased access to various 
financial products and the highest rates for borrowing money.113 
D. Using the Preferences of the Wealthy? 
The statistics on who has wills are not surprising: those with 
higher incomes, those who are white, and those who are older.114 
Examining the dispositions of wills provides insight into how those 
demographics—older, wealthier, whites—seek to dispose of their 
property. But those preferences may be skewed by that demographic.  
In our admittedly small empirical study, in which we found little 
planning, we observed that the utility of wills depended not necessarily 
on wealth but instead on family structure and relationship. That is, 
families who got along sometimes ignored the decedent’s wishes and 
distributed property as they deemed fair.115 That type of informal 
distribution may be what happens in the overwhelming majority of 
deaths that never make it to probate court. For example, of the more 
than 9000 deaths in 2016 in Pima County, Arizona (which includes 
 
 111.  Id.  
112.  How Does Intergenerational Wealth Transmission Affect Wealth 
Concentration? Accessible Data, FED. RES. BD., 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/how-does-intergenerational-
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20180601 [https://perma.cc/NGH2-ZL5Z]. 
 113.  DIANA ELLIOTT & RICKI GRANETZ LOWITZ, URBAN INST., WHAT IS THE 
COST OF POOR CREDIT? (2018), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99021/what_is_the_cost_of_poor_
credit.pdf [https://perma.cc/QDP5-8LY6]. 
 114.  Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority in U.S. Do Not Have a Will, GALLUP (May 
18, 2016), https://news.gallup.com/poll/191651/majority-not.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/LZG7-S4GQ]. 
 115.  Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 2, at 344–48. 
186 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
Tucson), less than 1% resulted in a probate filing.116  Part of this 
critique of the celebration of dead hand control, then, is not only that it 
gives control to the dead that the decedent may not necessarily have 
wanted (in light of the number of people who do not write wills), but 
also that it may be ignored by the survivors when it is contrary to their 
needs (particularly given the huge percentage of estates that stay out of 
probate court).  
 
III. MOVING FORWARD 
Asking the wealth question shows the impact of numerous trusts 
and estates doctrines on: (1) people of varying socioeconomic levels; 
(2) the need to adapt doctrine to address actual, rather than presumed, 
preferences; and (3) the benefits of drawing on alternative perspectives 
and experiences. This perspective shows us that decreasing economic 
inequality in America will require a series of large-scale policies. Some 
of them are familiar to trusts and estates scholars, such as increasing 
the marginal tax rate117 and the estate and gift tax,118 or changing 
various doctrines.119 Others come from outside of the field, as discussed 
at the end of this Essay.120  
I want to show how the wealth question applies in two contexts: 
wills for everyone and intestacy. Consider the underlying assumptions 
of each: does everyone really need a will, or should we work on 
improving the intestacy system? And do the intestacy rules reflect the 
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REV. 1255, 1256 (2013). 
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Chang, supra note 10, at 77. 
120.  See infra text at notes 137–38. 
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preferences of the decedents who do not write wills? And then, this 
Part turns to solutions outside of the field. 
A. Trusts and Estates and the Wealth Question 
1. WILLS FOR ALL 
There are numerous reasons to have a will,121 with the top reason 
most frequently consisting of some variation of testator control. But 
consider whether everyone needs to engage in such planning. Because 
outsider perspectives have caused us to see trusts and estates as not just 
focused on testator’s intent, but also on the structure of wealth and the 
meaning of inheritance to different groups of people, wills may not be 
useful for individuals who would choose the intestacy result122—or who 
prefer that surviving family members make decisions with relatively 
minimal guidance.123 Wills that enshrine dead hand control assume that 
the testator has some preference to express, some favored disposition 
that needs to be reinforced by a probate court. As a thought 
experiment, conjecture whether a decedent inevitably and always cares 
about asset disposition, or would want the survivors to do what they 
think is best, or might want to preserve family harmony by not making 
any such decisions.124 Studies of actual practices for estates that stay out 
of court, or are resolved without court challenge, may show the merely 
“precatory” nature of the testator’s preferences.125 The cases that do 
appear in court represent a tiny percentage of the population that dies 
each year.126 
While wills for everyone may not be an appropriate slogan, 
incapacity planning for everyone (somewhat clunkier) might be more 
appropriate. Adapting the initiatives in the wills context to ensure that 
individuals plan for their own capacity might be more helpful to ensure 
that wishes with respect to health care and financial planning are 
implemented. 
 
 121.  See, e.g., Top Ten Reasons to Have a Will, FINDLAW, 
https://estate.findlaw.com/wills/top-ten-reasons-to-have-a-will.html 
[https://perma.cc/7WS4-AZWF]. 
 122.  Horton, supra note 55, at 341 (“[A] critic might question the decision to 
draw inferences about intestacy from dispositive choices in wills.”). 
 123.  For those who plan, a power of appointment performs this function by 
deferring decisionmaking to a trusted powerholder as do discretionary distribution 
trusts. 
124.  This critique of dead hand control thus asks the wealth question by 
drawing on actual experiences and preferences. See supra note 9. 
 125.  Executors do have fiduciary responsibilities, of course. But only estates 
that go through probate court have such fiduciaries appointed. 
126.  See supra note 116 (discussing Pima County, Arizona). 
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2. INTESTACY RULES 
The intestacy rules are premised on the normative nuclear family, 
and they reflect the desires of many of those families.127 The UPC has 
steadfastly focused on marital relationships, not broadening provisions 
concerning intestacy, for example, to include civil unions or domestic 
partners.128 But the trends in nonmarriage, divorce, and short-term 
cohabitating unions have led to a wide assortment of stepfamilies and 
kin networks.129 
Some aspects of the intestacy laws reflect these changes, such as 
the share left to a surviving spouse when either the decedent or the 
survivor have non-joint children, with the surviving spouse in such 
situations receiving a smaller share than where there are only joint 
children.130 But other parts of the intestacy laws have not been revised 
to reflect these new family structures. While this may be entirely 
appropriate—many nonmarital partners, for example, may not want 
their assets distributed to the other partner upon death through 
intestacy131—it may not reflect the realities of functional families. In 
their study, for example, Danaya Wright and Beth Sterner found that a 
majority of decedents who had stepchildren left property to them.132 
 
* * * 
 
Applying a wealth lens would result in challenges to other 
doctrines. Consider revocation upon divorce statutes, which serve a 
function in protecting allegedly forgetful testators. Yet such a doctrine 
protects only a certain part of the population, and is not useful for low-
income people who are not married and may have no revocable-
beneficiary assets,133 thereby showing how the wealth lens affects the 
analysis. 
 
 127.  See, e.g., Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 2, at 337–38 (small sample); 
Danaya C. Wright & Beth Sterner, Honoring Probable Intent in Intestacy: An 
Empirical Assessment of the Default Rules and the Modern Family, 42 ACTEC L.J. 341 
(2017). 
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 129.  See PAUL TAYLOR, THE NEXT AMERICA: BOOMERS, MILLENNIALS, AND 
THE LOOMING GENERATIONAL SHOWDOWN (2014); CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 83. 
 130.  See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II; see also SUSAN N. GARY, JEROME 
BORISON, NAOMI R. CAHN & PAULA A. MONOPOLI, CONTEMPORARY TRUSTS AND 
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 131.  See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 
55 (2017). 
 132.  See Wright & Sterner, supra note 127, at 368. 
133.  See Naomi R. Cahn, Revisiting Revocation Upon Divorce?, 103 IOWA L. 
REV. 1879, 1901 (2018). 
2019:165 Dismantling the Trusts and Estates Canon 189 
B. Other Policies 
While trusts and estates law contributes to the intergenerational 
transmission of wealth (and corresponding inequality), the 
intergenerational transmission of wealth is not the sole culprit—or 
source—of challenging economic inequality.134 Consequently, it is 
useful to place reforms from within trusts and estates into a larger 
context that addresses wealth accumulation.135 Such approaches might 
include: 1) labor market policies that would contribute to a full 
employment economy; 2) universal access to health insurance; 3) free 
early childhood education and greater availability to subsidized, high 
quality child care, which could open up opportunities for children and 
their parents; 4) greater opportunities for retraining or returns to 
school, perhaps through community colleges, to give workers greater 
flexibility and resilience; and 5) a minimum income should be 
considered to provide any hope of greater individual and family 
security.136 
But the core is still wealth, and the existence of increasing 
economic inequality is at least partially the result of intergenerational 
wealth transmission; that process of wealth transmission provides the 
context for much of our scholarship in this field. Yet it also means that 
we must be attentive to just “[h]ow well any area of law safeguards the 
historically disadvantaged,”137 including trusts and estates. Building on 
that core insight, we must also be attentive to just how any area of law 
reflects societal prejudices and, more fundamentally, how difficult it is 
to change that area without changing the surrounding context. 
 
 134.  See George-Levi Gayle & Andrés Hincapié, Which Persists More from 
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